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Does bank ownership imply efficient monitoring? 
Evidence from bank lending and firm investment 
efficiencies in China  
 
Xiaofei Pan, School of Accounting and Finance, University of Wollongong 




This study investigates the effect of bank ownership on lending and firm investment 
efficiencies to give reasons for the mixed evidence that exists on the impact of bank 
ownership on firm performance. Using China’s listed firms as an example, we find that bank 
ownership reduces the efficiency of bank lending and harms investment efficiency for state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), while simultaneously relating to optimal lending decisions and 
enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. Our findings suggest that banks monitor non-
SOEs effectively, but are less effective at monitoring SOEs. We document that banks’ ex post 
monitoring on non-SOEs’ investment policy results from their more effective ex ante 
monitoring of their lending decisions. Further analysis suggests that bank ownership hurts 
firm performance for SOEs while enhancing firm performance for non-SOEs. Overall, we 
document that in an emerging market where SOEs and non-SOEs co-exist, bank ownership 
affects firm performance by influencing the lending decision and firm investment policy, 
while the effectiveness of their monitoring varies with the firm’s ownership structure.  
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A large body of literature argues that banks are able to provide more efficient debt-
related external monitoring for the corporate governance of firms because they have a 
comparative cost advantage in accessing superior inside information (Fama, 1985; Datta et 
al., 1999). However, if banks hold the equity of companies, they also have incentives to also 
exert internal monitoring. Recently, an evolving literature began to focus on bank holding 
ownership of non-financial companies and its consequence on the corporate governance 
system. These studies tend towards views regarding the effect of bank holding ownership (we 
use bank ownership later in the paper) on firm performance with no agreement. One view 
agrees that banks can obtain proprietary information of companies by holding their equities 
and evidence from developed markets supports the notion that bank ownership is beneficial 
to companies. These studies argue that bank ownership can promote companies’ access to 
bank capital and exercise effective monitoring, which can improve firm performance (Kang 
et al., 2000; Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Bris et al., 2006; Mahrt-Smith, 2006). The other 
view focusses on bank’s harmful effect and argues that being shareholder and lender, bank 
ownership leads to more serious potential conflict of interests in emerging markets where the 
bank is the main capital provider and bank credit is scarce and highly regulated by the 
government (Cull and Xu, 2000). There is evidence to suggest that although bank ownership 
allows companies to have better access to debt financing in emerging markets, banks also 
monitor less, and bank ownership does not necessarily improve firm performance (Fok et al., 
2004; Limpahayom and Polwitoon, 2004; Lin et al., 2009).  
Although the effect of bank ownership on firm performance has been established with 
mixed results, there is no comprehensive analysis showing the mechanism through which 
bank ownership works to affect firm performance in an emerging market. Moreover, although 
previous studies conjecture that banks may extensively monitor their loans through their 
ownership of the borrowing firms, these studies provide no direct evidence about how banks 
monitor firms and what are the related costs and benefits of bank ownership practice. In this 
paper, we attempt to address the following two questions: How does bank ownership 
influence bank lending decisions and firms’ investment decisions? And what is the financial 
consequence of such bank ownership? 
To answer these questions, we take on the perspective of banks’ ex ante and ex post 
monitoring over their funds lending to achieve a better understanding of their monitoring role 
over corporate governance in emerging markets. In particular, we explore the channel(s) 
through which bank ownership affects firm performance by investigating how banks exercise 
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ex ante monitoring through influencing lending decisions and ex post monitoring by 
influencing firm investment policies, using a sample of China’s listed firms. We focus on 
both the lending decision and firm investment policy for the following reasons. First, existing 
studies document that bank ownership may affect banks’ lending decision by providing 
evidence that bank ownership facilitates capital flow and promotes companies’ access to bank 
capital (Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Lin et al., 2009). In addition, bank lending can have an 
important influence on firms’ investment policies (Lang et al., 1996; Kang et al., 2000; 
Aivazian et al., 2005; Firth et al., 2008). Second, the conflict of interest between shareholders 
and lenders creates incentives to deviate from optimal investment (Kang et al., 2000), and 
this interest conflict could be mitigated by permitting banks to hold equity in companies 
(Kroszner and Strahan, 2001). Moreover, existing literature finds that investment 
significantly influences firm performance because firm performance responds positively to 
better investment and gains from investments enhance firm profitability (Fama and French, 
1998; Core et al., 1999; Hutchinson and Gul, 2004; Aggarwal and Samwick, 2006; Chen et 
al., 2009). Third, since the recent global financial crisis, bank lending and firm investment 
policy has attracted considerable interest from academics and practitioners. In response to the 
financial crisis, the Chinese government initiated an economic stimulus package to encourage 
bank lending and firm investment. Therefore, the economic stimulus package as an 
exogenous shock provided a unique opportunity for examining the effect that bank ownership 
has on lending decision and firm investment efficiency, with a reduced concern for 
endogeneity.  
While banks holding equity of non-financial companies is not unique in China, the 
Chinese corporate and financial environment is particularly interesting for this research. First, 
China is the largest transition economy and is characterized as having an absence of mature 
public bond markets. Corporate external finance relies mostly on bank borrowing, so banks 
play a very important role in determining the availability of credit. In addition, the Chinese 
financial system is dominated by the government through the direct and indirect state 
ownership and control of most banks, while the lending decisions of these banks often 
reflects the policies dictated by government (Firth et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2013). This is to 
say that state-owned banks dominate Chinese financial system and they tend to allocate and 
price loans according to the preferences of the government.  
Second, the co-existence of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-SOEs in China 
provides another unique institutional environment to examine different effects of bank 
ownership on lending and investment efficiencies, and firm performance. Because the 
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objectives of state-owned banks are to maximize their multiple objectives combined with 
political and economic ones, they tend to lend largely to SOEs and bail out poorly performing 
SOEs, and are able to ignore SOEs’ non-performing loans (Cull and Xu, 2003; Firth et al., 
2008). Because the central government must bear the final responsibility for these 
consequences, state-owned banks have a lack of due-diligence monitoring over their lending 
decisions, and less incentives to exert disciplinary pressures on SOEs for their liabilities. If 
banks also become owners of SOEs, which indicates a better and more stable bank-firm 
relationship, these SOEs are more favoured by state-owned banks’ lending which may 
eventually lead to an inefficient allocation of capital because these SOEs are more likely to 
get bank loans regardless of their profitability and creditworthiness (Zheng and Zhu, 2013). 
This soft lending then encourages SOEs with bank ownership to invest more into building 
their empires regardless of whether they have good investment opportunities or not. 
Therefore, this favoured lending to SOEs with bank ownership will reduce investment 
efficiency of these firms (Firth et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2009). In contrast, non-SOEs are 
similar to their counterparties in developed market and they have a simpler objective of value 
maximization (Chen et al., 2011), and banks are able to extend their discipline and 
monitoring to the non-SOEs firms they lend to (Santos and Rumble, 2006). Moreover, bank 
shareholders are eager to maximize their proceeds by advocating effective monitoring on 
firms’ investments. On this basis the homogeneity of state ownership makes China an 
excellent context to examine the monitoring effect of bank ownership on bank lending 
decisions and firm investment policy across SOEs and non-SOEs. In addition, an 
investigation into the bank-firm relationship through bank ownership and empirical evidence 
on the effect of bank ownership on lending and firm investment efficiencies in an 
environment where state ownership dominates the financial system provides a useful addition 
to the literature.   
Furthermore, the unique Chinese institutional setting for bank equity investments also 
allows us to further reduce any concerns of an endogeneity issue. Although the new 
Commercial Bank Law implemented in 1995 did not force banks to relinquish their existing 
ownership in listed non-financial firms, they have not been allowed to invest any new equity 
in non-financial firms since then. Therefore bank ownership during our sample period (2003 
to 2010) is largely exogenously determined and less likely to be affected by the firm 
characteristics and corporate governance variables. This is perhaps the most significant 
advantage of using Chinese data in that it allows us to infer bank ownership whose formation 
predates, by several years, the lending and firm investment policy we wish to analyse. We 
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argue that such a lag between bank ownership formation and lending and investment policy 
removes the reverse causality concerns to some extent. Nevertheless, we will also apply 
alternative approaches to dealing with the endogeneity issue, including a natural experiment, 
and a two-stage least square and fixed effect regression.  
From the empirical analysis, we find that bank ownership reinforces the exercise of using 
commercial judgements in allocating capital to non-SOEs, which is consistent with previous 
studies (Firth et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2013), whilst bank ownership is more likely to reduce 
bank lending efficiency and lead to capital misallocation for SOEs. We further find that bank 
ownership is likely to enhance investment efficiency only in non-SOEs, while in SOEs bank 
ownership relates to a less efficient investment. Overall, our findings of the effect of bank 
ownership on firm behaviour suggests that inefficient firm investment is accompanied with 
inefficient bank lending decisions, and the effectiveness of banks’ monitoring is reflected by 
both ex ante and ex post of their capital allocation.   
Our findings also suggest that bank ownership in non-SOEs aligns the interests between 
lenders and shareholders by exerting effective monitoring function to enhance investment 
efficiency, while bank ownership in SOEs actually exaggerates the conflict of interests 
between lender and shareholder which results in less efficient investment. We argue that 
whether a bank plays a monitoring role by directly holding the ownership of companies relies 
heavily on the governance framework and ownership structure.  
Our findings also confirm that bank ownership is less likely to add firm value for SOEs, 
which is consistent with the evidence from other emerging markets (Fok et al., 2004; 
Limpahayom and Polwitoon, 2004; Lin et al., 2009), while bank ownership is more likely to 
increase firm value for non-SOEs, which is similar to the case of developed markets. Our 
investigation complements the notion that bank ownership can be a double-edged sword in 
emerging markets.    
This study contributes to the existing literature in the following ways. First, although the 
relationship between banks and firms through bank ownership, and its consequence on firm 
performance and valuation has recently evolved with mixed evidence, little is known about 
how bank ownership works to affect firm performance, especially in emerging markets. 
Specifically, the evidence from developed markets supports a positive effect of bank 
ownership on firm performance (Kang et al., 2000; Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Bris et al., 
2006), while evidence from emerging markets agrees with a negative effect (Fok et al., 2004; 
Limpahayom and Polwitoon, 2004; Lin et al., 2009). We propose that bank lending and firm 
investment are the channels through which bank ownership can affect firm performance. In 
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particular, we argue that whether bank ownership can increase firm value depends heavily on 
the investment efficiency. Moreover, according to the existing argument that how banks 
monitor the borrower depends on the severity of the agency problems (Harvey et al., 2004), 
our evidence also adds new insight into optimal investment design resulting from mitigating 
the conflicts of interest.  
Second, we complement a growing literature relating to the bank-firm relationship. 
Extant literature has suggested a few proxies for this relationship, such as relationship 
banking (Boot, 2000; Bharath et al., 2011), pre-existing borrower-lender personal relationship 
(Engelberg et al., 2012), holding bank ownership (Berger et al., 2009) and appointing bankers 
onto the board (Krosnzer and Strahan, 2001; Byrd and Mizruchi, 2005), while this study 
extends our understanding of bank’s impact on firms’ corporate decisions from a more direct 
perspective, namely bank holding ownership of listed companies. We argue that through their 
ownership holding, banks are able to vote on important corporate matters which will affect 
firms’ financing and investment decisions. We also add additional evidence to the literature 
of bank-firm relationship in an emerging market. Extending from the evidence from 
developed markets (Gorton and Schmid, 2000; Kang et al., 2000; Kroszner and Strahan, 
2001), and along with findings from other emerging markets (Fok et al., 2004; Limpahayom 
and Polwitoon, 2004; Lin et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2011), we conclude that how bank 
ownership works to affect corporate decisions relies on firm’s ownership structure and the 
institutional and governance environment.  
Third, we contribute to the literature of government intervention. The objective of the 
economic stimulus package initiated by the government is to drive back the GDP growth rate 
by bank lending and investing in the domestic market, so it is of a particular interest to 
understand the effect of the stimulus package on both bank lending and firm investment 
efficiency at the cross-sectional level. There are public concerns that the mounting bad debts 
and over capacities induced by the Chinese stimulus package could result in an economic 
crisis in China, which might be even worse than that in U.S. We will provide direct evidence 
for the impact of the economic stimulus package on economic efficiency by investigating 
whether both bank lending and investment efficiencies in firms with or without bank 
ownership has moderated or been exacerbated by this government intervention. More 
precisely, we attempt to disentangle the change in investment policies in these firms before 
and after the stimulus package implementation. In addition, the economic stimulus package 
can also be used as a natural experiment to alleviate any potential endogeneity concerns, 
because the economic stimulus package provided an exogenous policy shock to each 
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individual firm where bank ownership was exogenously set outside the equation rather than 
being determined by a firm.  
Fourth, we add new evidence to demonstrate the relationship between bank lending 
decisions and firm investment policies in the particular context of China. Extant studies focus 
on either how banks make lending decisions or how firms make investment policies. One 
strand finds that state owned banks tend to lend to SOEs regardless of their creditworthiness 
(Cull and Xu, 2003), while they exercise commercial judgement in allocating capital to non-
SOEs (Firth et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2013). The other strand finds that firm investment 
depends on investment opportunities and leverage level, while investment efficiency is 
largely influenced by government intervention (Firth et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2011; Zheng 
and Zhu, 2013). Our study aims to connect bank lending decisions to firms’ investment 
policies and we provide new evidence to the literature that lower (better) investment 
efficiency has resulted from lower (better) lending efficiency, which was determined by bank 
monitoring and ownership structure.  
Finally, our research adds new evidence to the literature concerning the effect of bank 
ownership outside of U.S. Because the existing regulations have prevented banks from 
investing equity in non-financial firms in the U.S., the literature on bank ownership is almost 
entirely related to Germany and Japan where banks’ equity investments, which are allowed 
by their regulations, are a common phenomenon. Recently, an evolving literature relating to 
the bank ownership began to focus on emerging markets such as China (Lin et al., 2009; Luo 
et al., 2011), and of course our study enriches this literature by providing additional evidence 
of the effect of bank ownership on bank lending decisions and firm investment policies.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow: Section 2 reviews the background of 
bank ownership and economic stimulus package in China and develops our main hypotheses; 
Section 3 describes the data and methodology; Section 4 reports our empirical evidence; and 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Institutional background and hypothesis development 
2.1 Bank ownership in China 
The Chinese banking industry reform was launched by the government from the late 
1970s1. In the early 1980s, the government established four wholly state-owned banks (the 
Big Four), who took control of all the commercial banking functions of the People’s Bank of 
                                                          




China (the central bank). Later on in 1994, three wholly state-owned policy banks2 were 
established and took over the policy lending functions from the Big Four banks, and it was 
from that time that joint stock commercial banks and city banks began to emerge in China. 
Because China is featured as lacking a public bond market and placing a heavy reliance on 
bank borrowing, during the early 1990s these banks were the only type of financial 
institutions in the market and as such were actively involved in providing capital for 
corporate sector growth, but under supervision from the People’s Bank of China.  
During the same period, and starting from the early 1990s, two stock exchanges were 
established in Shanghai and Shenzhen and many SOEs undertook reform to become listed on 
either of these stock exchanges. According to the regulations of the central bank, commercial 
banks were encouraged to participate in the sponsorship and underwriting business of initial 
public offerings (IPO) of these listed SOEs (Cao, 2008), to become initial shareholders of 
these IPO firms. In this sense these bank ownerships were formed before these listed firms 
began to trade publicly. In 1995 the Commercial Bank Law (revised in 2003) clearly 
prohibited commercial banks from holding new ownership in non-financial companies 
without special permission from the authorities.  
The law not only prohibited banks from holding equity of listed firms, it also prevented 
commercial banks from becoming shareholders of listed firms through other channels, such 
as becoming the legal shareholders of firms who defaulted on their loans, or through the debt-
for-equity swap. Although banks can no longer become shareholders of listed companies 
through direct investment, it is worth noting that they can still exert an active influence 
through their existing ownership of the companies (Luo et al., 2011). 
2.2 Economic stimulus package 
Since the global financial crisis of 2007, many governments took measures to recover 
their economy by implementing economic stimulus packages. In response to the financial 
crisis the Chinese government also announced a 4 trillion RMB (about $586 billion) 
economic stimulus package which accounted for 12.5% of total GDP in 2008, spending from 
the fourth quarter 2008 to 2010. The stimulus package refers to investment spending, which 
was officially announced on 5th November 2008. Of the total 4 trillion RMB plan the central 
government directly committed a fund of 1.18 trillion RMB of the investment, which was 
30% of the overall program, while the rest was funded by local governments and banks. In 
reality the disbursement of central government stimulus spending included six tranches. 
                                                          
2 These are State Development Banks, the Agricultural Development Bank of China and the Export and Import 
Bank of China.  
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Altogether, the central government input to the stimulus totalled 1.6 trillion which is more 
than what was planned originally. Meanwhile, local governments actively echoed the central 
stimulus program which accounted for 70% to 75% of budgetary expenditures on fixed 
investment. Among the 34 administrative regions in China, 24 regions announced respective 
investment plans. For example, Yunnan and Liaoning provinces announced 3 trillion and 1.3 
trillion RMB investment plans, respectively. The economic stimulus package was not only 
involved in expanding government investment plans by focussing mainly on transportation 
and infrastructure programs, it also accelerated bank loans lent to firms, particularly SOEs. 
Thus, the economic stimulus package had a direct influence on lending decisions and firm 
investment policies. The implementation of this economic stimulus package suggests that 
government intervention affects lending decisions and firm investment policies, which 
enables us to add new evidence to the literature. 
 
2.3 Hypothesis development 
Our first hypothesis relates to banks’ ex ante monitoring for their lending decisions. 
There is a growing body of literature on the practice of bank lending where academics focus 
on whether banks make optimal lending decisions or efficient capital allocation. China has an 
underdeveloped financial system and lack a public bond market, which means that banks are 
the main providers of capital while bank credits are scarce (Cull and Xu, 2000). Because the 
Chinese banking industry is controlled mainly by the state, because of the policy factors and 
homogeneity of state ownership, these state owned banks have a propensity to lend to SOEs 
regardless of their profitability (Cull and Xu, 2003; Firth et al., 2009). Moreover, bank 
ownership may facilitate SOEs to easier access to more bank loans. In addition, in the context 
of China, non-SOEs face being discriminated against access to bank loans and try to survive 
and sustain their growth, and they have incentives to seek external financing support by 
establishing connections with banks (Li et al., 2008; Firth et al., 2009). As a form of bank-
firm connection, bank ownership may help non-SOEs to get bank loans more readily. 
Following the existing evidence that banks allocate capital to financially healthier non-SOEs 
using commercial judgements (Firth et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2013), we expect that bank 
ownership helps non-SOEs to achieve better firm performance based on which more bank 
loans will be awarded. Therefore, we have the following hypothesis: 
H1: Bank ownership reduces the bank lending efficiency for SOEs, and enhances bank 
lending efficiency for non-SOEs 
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Our next hypothesis relates to banks’ ex post monitoring and examines how bank 
ownership affects subsequent firm investment policy. A large body of literature provides 
evidence that conflicts of interest between shareholders and lenders exerts influence on firm 
investment and creates incentives to deviate from optimal investment policies3. Meanwhile, 
literature regarding bank ownership argues that permitting banks to hold equity of non-
financial companies can mitigate or even eliminate the conflict which may lead to optimal 
investment. This hypothesis intends to investigate how bank ownership affects investment 
policy and whether the effects of bank ownership are consistent across both SOEs and non-
SOEs. Extant evidence argues that banks are reluctant to play effective monitoring roles in 
emerging markets as they do in developed markets (Barth et al., 2006). In China, more than 
90% of the banking assets are owned and controlled by the state, and the financial system is 
dominated by state ownership and most firm borrowings are supported by bank loans (Firth et 
al., 2008). State owned banks follow the objectives set by politicians and bureaucrats to serve 
both political and economic objectives, and they tend to have lending behaviours that allocate 
and price loans according to the preferences and priorities of governments (Cull and Xu, 
2000). State owned banks are obliged to lend largely to SOEs in order to maintain normal 
economic growth and achieve social goals (Cull and Xu, 2005; Allen et al., 2005). The 
homogeneity of state ownership at both bank-level and firm-level leads to a positive lending 
bias to SOEs (Firth et al., 2008), which creates less incentives for banks to extend monitoring 
and encourages SOEs to engage in sub-optimal investments. Furthermore, if banks also hold 
ownership of SOEs, which indicates a better and more stable bank relationship, these SOEs 
are more favoured by state-owned bank lending which may eventually affect the efficiency of 
capital allocation and distort firm investment decisions (Firth et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2009). In 
this sense we conjecture that bank ownership may not exercise effective monitoring over firm 
investment efficiency for SOEs.  
Although we anticipate a negative impact of bank ownership on investment efficiency 
for SOEs, this effect could be different for non-SOEs. Non-SOE listed firms evolved since 
2001 and they are comparable in many ways to their counterparts in developed economies 
where value maximization is the dominating objective (Allen et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2011). 
In non-SOEs, bank ownership faces an apparent conflict of interest and is likely to extend 
monitoring functions, which may influence firm investment in favour of their own interest of 
liability quality (Lin et al., 2009). As bank ownership is effective to alleviate asymmetric 
                                                          
3 The asset-substitution problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977), and 
the overinvestment problem (Stulz, 1990) are well-known examples of such distortions of investment policy. 
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information and agency problems (Kroszner and Strahan, 2001), bank ownership in turn will 
overcome the distortions to optimal investment choices induced by capital market 
imperfections (Chen et al., 2011). Consistent with our discussion, we construct our 
hypothesis as follow: 
H2: Bank ownership reduces investment efficiency for SOEs, while enhances investment 
efficiency for non-SOEs  
 
3. Sample selection and methodology 
3.1 Sample selection 
Our sample data are obtained from the Chinese Stock and Market Accounting Research 
database (CSMAR) from 2003 to 2010 for all of listed firms on both the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. We start our sample from 2003 because the new accounting and 
auditing standards were applied in China in 2002. Following common practice, we delete 
financial firms and firms flagged with ST or ST*. We also exclude firm-year observations 
with missing information on the variables that are used in this study. Finally, our sample 
consists of 1,073 firms and 8,476 firm-year observations. 
3.2 Bank ownership 
We manually collect the information on bank ownership by following the steps described 
below. First, from the Corporate Governance database of CSMAR, we are able to assemble 
detailed information on the top ten largest shareholders and the ownership holding by each of 
these top ten largest shareholders in the firms. We then identify that whether one of the top 
ten largest shareholders is a bank. We then go through the IPO prospectus of the companies 
with bank ownership and ensure that commercial banks were among the original sponsors 
and shareholders in the IPO of these listed firms. To ensure the objective of bank ownership 
holding, we exclude the bank ownership obtained from the debt-to-equity swap in SOEs 
reform, which is consistent with Lin et al. (2009) and Luo et al. (2011). We apply two proxies 
for bank ownership. The first measure is a dummy variable Bankdummy, which is equal to 1 
if at least one of the top ten largest shareholders is a bank and 0 otherwise. The second 
measure is Bankshare which is the percentage of shares held by bank shareholders. Table 1 
reports a detailed summary of bank ownership in China’s listed firms over our sample by 
year. Table 1 reveals there are 498 firm-year observations with bank shareholder out of the 
8,496 firm-year observations. From Table 1 we find that the total number of firms with bank 
as the shareholder decreases and the corresponding percentage also decreases over time from 
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88 (8.71%) in 2003 to 50 (4.83%) in 2010.  These results are comparative with the data 
reported by Lin et al. (2009) and Luo et al. (2011). 
Table 1. Summary of bank ownership 
Year Total Firms with bank ownership Percentage of bank ownership 
2003 1,010 88 8.71% 
2004 1,096 80 7.30% 
2005 1,095 77 7.03% 
2006 1,082 51 4.71% 
2007 1,013 51 5.03% 
2008 1,078 51 4.73% 
2009 1,068 50 4.68% 
2010 1,034 50 4.83% 
Total 8,476 498 5.88% 
 
3.3 Other variables 
To remain consistent with most extant literature, we obtain the information from the 
balance sheet and we use the ratio of total bank loans to total debt as the proxy for firms’ 
access to bank loans. As previous studies suggest that banks should extend credits to 
profitable firms, we use the sensitivity of bank loan granted to firm profitability as the proxy 
for bank lending efficiency, where we apply the return on sales (ROS) as the measure for 
firm profitability, following Firth et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2013). In addition, we select 
the financial information from the cash flow statements and measure investment expenditure 
for a firm as the ratio of net capital expenditure (the capital expenditure less depreciation) to 
net fixed assets, as used by Lang et al. (1996), Aivazian et al. (2005) and Firth et al. (2008). 
Empirically, a firm’s investment should be solely determined by the profitability of its 
investment as measured by Tobin’s Q (Chen et al., 2011), given Q as a summary of statistics 
for the market’s information about investment opportunities. In this paper we apply the 
relationship between investment expenditure and Tobin’s Q as the measure of investment 
efficiency. In the multivariate analysis, we also include a set of control variables which have 
been proved to have an effect on bank lending decisions and firm investment expenditures. 
All of the variables used in this study are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Variable and definitions 
Variable  Definitions 
Bankdummy Equal 1 for firm-year observations if the bank is holding ownership of the firm 
Bankshare Percentage of shares held by the bank shareholders 
Bankloan Bank loans / Total debt 
Investment (Capital expenditure-depreciation) / Net fixed assets 
ROA Net income / Total assets 
ROS Net income / Sales 
Leverage Bank loans /  Total assets 
Income Net income + depreciation /  Total assets 
Tobin’s Q Market value /  Replacement value 
Size Log of total assets 
Sales Sales / Total assets 
Tangibility Tangible assets / Total assets 
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Board Number of total directors on the boards 
Indep Number of independent directors / Total number of directors on board 
Largest Ownership of the largest shareholder for each firm 
Political Equal 1 for firms with politically connected executives or large shareholders 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Summary statistics 
We present summary statistics of bank ownership, investment expenditures, and firm 
characteristics in Table 3. As Table 3 shows, we find that there are 5.88% of total firm-year 
observations with banks as the shareholders, and the average bank ownership is 0.13% with a 
maximum of 26.82%. We also present that the average bank loan to total debt ratio is 48.11% 
over our sample. The mean (median) of the ratio of net investment to fixed assets is 28.88% 
(15.16%), which is close to the 34.1% (14.8%) reported by Firth et al. (2008). The sample 
average Tobin’s Q is 1.62 and the median value is 1.18, and the average internal cash flow 
ratio is 4.75% which is similar to that reported in Euro zone of 3.9% by Pindado et al. (2011).  
Table 3. Summary statistics  
 Mean Median Min Lower quartile Higher quartile Max Obs 
Bankdummy 5.88% 0 0 0 0 1 8476 
Bankshare (%) 0.13 0 0 0 0 26.82 8476 
Bankloan (%) 48.11 49.29 0 28.26 65.45 99.88 8476 
Investment (%) 28.88 15.16 -9.86 6.20 28.47 306.33 8476 
ROA (%) 2.63 2.74 -68.26 0.84 5.39 46.31 8476 
ROS (%) 5.47 4.45 -29.61 1.47 10.03 69.39 8476 
Leverage (%) 51.56 51.78 0.02 38.23 63.86 89.88 8476 
Income (%) 4.75 5.08 -8.70 2.93 8.19 11.48 8476 
Tobin’s Q 1.62 1.18 0.49 1.02 1.56 16.89 8476 
Firm size (million) 6,230 2,190 27.3 1,130 4,490 98,500 8476 
Sales (%) 72.03 56.75 0.95 34.84 87.27 100.03 8476 
Tangibility (%) 29.86 27.28 0.20 15.69 42.98 157.48 8476 
Board 8.75 9 0 7 10 23 8476 
Indep (%) 0.41 0.36 0 0.33 0.5 0.75 8476 
Largest (%) 46.32 40.77 1.73 27.13 58.25 85.23 8476 
Political 0.43 0 0 0 1 1 8476 
This table provides summary statistics of our sample. Bankdummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm 
has a bank as the shareholder. Bankshare is the percentage of ownership held by bank shareholder. Bankloan is 
the ratio of total bank loans to total debt value.  Investment is the ratio of net capital expenditure to total fixed 
assets. ROA is the return on assets, measured as the ratio of net income to total assets. ROS is the return on 
sales, measured as the ratio of net income to total sales. Leverage is the ratio of bank loans to total assets. 
Income is the ratio of internal cash flow to total assets. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of firm market value to 
replacement value. Firm size is firm total assets. Sale is the ratio of sales to total assets. Tangibility is the ratio 
of tangible assets to total assets. Board is the number of total directors on the board. Indep is the ratio of 
independent directors to total directors on the board. Largest is the percentage of ownership held by the largest 
shareholder. Political is a dummy variable, equal 1 for politically connected firms. 
 
4.2 Empirical results 
4.2.1 Univariate tests 
To provide some empirical evidence to support our hypotheses we conduct the following 
univariate tests by comparing the bank loans, investments, firm performance and firm 
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characteristics for firms with and without bank ownership, and the results are reported in 
Table 4. In Table 4 we compare the mean of our key variables between firms with and 
without bank ownership. Our tests cover the full sample as well as both SOE and non-SOE 
sub-samples. For the full sample we find that bank ownership facilitates capital flows and the 
bank loan ratio is 50.92% for firms with bank ownership, which is significantly higher than 
46.05% for firms without bank ownership, and firms with bank ownership have a lower ROS 
(4.12%) compared with firms without bank ownership (5.55%). We also find that firms with 
bank ownership have significantly higher mean investment expenditures (31.24% vs. 
25.19%) but lower mean Tobin’s Q (1.38 vs. 1.60) than firms without bank ownership. For 
the SOE sub-sample we find that the bank loan ratio is significantly higher and ROS is 
significantly lower for firms with bank ownership than those for firms without bank 
ownership. We also observe no significant difference in investment expenditure, but firms 
with bank ownership have a significantly lower Tobin’s Q than firms without bank 
ownership. As for the non-SOE sub-sample, we present that firms with bank ownership have 
both a higher bank loan ratio and ROS than those firms without bank ownership. We further 
find that both investment expenditure and Tobin’s Q are higher for firms with bank 
ownership than those firms without bank ownership.  
In addition to the differences in the level of bank loans, investment expenditures and 
Tobin’s Q, there are also significant differences in accounting-based firm performance (ROA 
and ROS). In particular, firm performance is significantly lower in firms with bank 
ownership for the full sample and SOE sub-sample, while significantly higher in firms with 
bank ownership for the non-SOE sub-sample. For example, for the full sample the ROA is 
1.57% for firms with bank ownership which is significantly lower than 2.40% for firms 
without bank ownership (t-value is -2.64). We also observe significant differences in control 
variables from Table 4, suggesting the need to control for these variables in analysing 
investment efficiency.  
Table 4. Univariate tests 
 Full sample SOEs Non-SOEs 
 With Without t-value With Without t-value With Without t-value 
Bankloan 
(%) 
50.92 46.05 4.87*** 
(2.89) 
50.70 45.93 4.77*** 
(2.66) 




31.24 25.19 6.05*** 
(2.73) 
32.76 29.31 3.45 
(1.28) 
29.20 24.19 5.01*** 
(2.62) 
Tobin’s Q 1.38 1.60 -0.22*** 
(-3.56) 
1.12 1.55 -0.43*** 
(-4.28) 
1.81 1.63 0.18** 
(2.56) 
ROA (%) 1.57 2.40 -0.83** 
(-2.64) 
1.46 2.53 -1.07** 
(-2.83) 
2.47 1.78 0.69** 
(2.02) 
ROS (%) 4.12 5.55 -1.43** 
(-2.02) 
3.85 5.73 -1.88*** 
(-2.71) 






9,530 5,610 3,920** 
(2.23) 
11,400 6,750 4,650** 
(1.97) 




4,270 2,030 2,240** 
(2.17) 
5,340 2,580 2,760** 
(1.99) 




53.17 49.97 3.20** 
(2.24) 
49.85 50.81 -0.96 
(-0.84) 




3.91 4.78 -0.87 
(-1.32) 
4.51 5.37 -0.86 
(-1.06) 




67.61 70.67 -3.06 
(-1.23) 
70.80 73.59 -2.79 
(-0.99) 
58.40 63.42 -5.02 
(-0.97) 
Board 9.15 8.72 0.43*** 
(3.33) 
9.43 8.96 0.47*** 
(3.19) 
8.31 8.12 0.19 
(0.79) 
Indep (%) 39.24 41.57 -2.33*** 
(-3.09) 
38.08 40.84 -1.76*** 
(-3.52) 
42.57 43.39 -0.82 
(-0.45) 
Largest (%) 46.24 48.51 -1.27*** 
(-3.19) 
38.76 41.26 -2.50*** 
(-2.90) 
28.96 31.72 -2.76*** 
(-2.82) 
Political 36.50 43.68 -7.18*** 
(-3.10) 
41.23 47.78 -6.55** 
(-2.38) 
23.15 33.43 -10.28** 
(-2.56) 
 
4.2.2 Bank ownership and bank lending efficiency 
In this section we conduct a multivariate analysis to examine the effect of bank 
















                      
                      
*
      (1) 
where Bankloan is the ratio of total bank loans to total debt level, which is the proxy for the 
firm’s access to bank loans. Bank is the measurement of bank ownership. We apply two 
proxies in the regression respectively. One is the dummy variable Bankdummy, which is 
equal to 1 if the firm has a bank shareholder. Another is Bankshare which is the percentage of 
shares held by bank shareholders. ROS is return on sales which is the proxy for firm 
performance. Q is the value of Tobin’s Q calculated as the ratio of firm market value to 
replacement value, which is used to proxy for the firm investment opportunity (Firth et al., 
2008; Chen et al., 2011). Size is the log of firm total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of tangible 
assets to firm total assets. Political is a dummy variable if the firm is politically connected. 
Board is the log of the total number of directors on the boards. Indep is the ratio of 
independent directors to total directors on the boards. We also include year and industry fixed 
effects. Following previous studies, we use the one year lag of bank ownership, firm 
performance and Tobin’s Q in the regression. Table 5 reports our regression results. 
Table 5. Effect of bank ownership on bank lending efficiency 















Bankshare  0.14**  0.15*  0.35** 
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(2.06) (1.77) (2.41) 






































































































Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Sum tests a 4.52*** 4.66*** 4.41*** 3.48*** 3.39*** 3.69*** 
Adjusted R2 0.31 0.32 0.25 0.25 0.40 0.40 
Observations 8476 8476 5939 5939 2537 2537 
a Reports the significance tests of the sum of the estimated coefficients between ROS and Bankdummy*ROS, and 
between ROS and Bankshare*ROS in each regression. 
Dependent variable is the ratio of bank loans to total debt level of the firm. Bankdummy is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the firm has a bank shareholder and 0 otherwise. Bankshare is the percentage of shares held by 
bank shareholders. ROS is the return on sales. Q is the ratio of firm market value to replacement value. Size is 
the log of firm total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of firm’s tangible assets to total assets. Political is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the firm is politically connected. Board is the log of number of total directors on the 
boards. Indep is the ratio of independent directors to total directors on the boards.  
 
Table 5 reports our models and we observe that both measurements of bank ownership 
are significantly and positively related to the bank loan ratio. This results hold irrespective of 
ownership structure and are consistent for both SOEs and non-SOEs. In the spirit of previous 
studies (Firth et al., 2009), we apply the relationship between the bank loan ratio and firm 
performance as an indication of whether banks make optimal lending decisions, and a 
positive relationship between the bank loan ratio and firm performance suggests efficient 
lending. When we turn to interaction terms between bank ownership and ROS, more 
evidence emerges. For the full sample, the estimated coefficients on both Bankdummy*ROS 
and Bankshare*ROS are negative, suggesting that bank ownership may distort bank lending 
decisions. In addition, for both the SOE and non-SOE sub-samples, we find that the 
attenuating effect of bank ownership on bank lending efficiency is more pronounced for 
SOEs, indicating less monitoring functions exercised by bank ownership in SOEs. However 
for non-SOEs, the estimated coefficients on interaction terms are positive and statistically 
significant, suggesting that unlike SOEs, bank ownership is more likely to extend effective 
monitoring for non-SOEs and can help financially healthier non-SOEs to get more bank 
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loans. We also report the significance of the sum tests in the table with the results suggesting 
that our findings are statistically significant. For example in column 5 for non-SOEs, the sum 
test is 3.69 significant at the 1% level, suggesting that for non-SOEs, the estimated 
coefficient on ROS is 0.05 (0.02+0.03) and the banks exercise efficient lending to non-SOEs. 
Overall, our findings from Table 5 suggest that bank ownership exercises less monitoring and 
reduces bank lending efficiency for SOEs, while bank ownership is effective in monitoring 
bank lending efficiency for non-SOEs. We also find that return on sales (ROS) is positively 
related to the bank loan ratio across all six specifications. This result is consistent with those 
obtained by previous studies that banks tend to allocate loans to profitable firms using their 
commercial judgements (Cull and Xu, 2005; Firth et al., 2009; Zheng and Zhu, 2013). 
Among the control variables we find that political connection facilitates firm’s access to bank 
loans, which is consistent with most previous studies (Li et al., 2008; Faccio, 2010). As a 
robustness test, we also apply another two measurements. One is the change in the bank loan 
ratio between the current and previous year, and the other one is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the firm has outstanding bank loans.  We also replace ROS with ROA (return on assets) in 
the regression and we obtain similar results.  
4.2.3 Bank ownership and firm investment efficiency 
In the following section we conduct multivariate analysis to examine the effect of bank 













                      
*
      (2) 
where Investment is a firm’s investment expenditures. Existing studies also applied other 
proxies for investment which we will consider for the robustness tests4. Leverage is defined 
as the proportion of bank loans of total assets. Income is used to measure internal funds 
available for investments, which is measured as the ratio of net income plus depreciation to 
total assets. We follow prior studies to control for the rate of sales growth.  In particular, Sale 
is the net sales scaled by total assets. We also include year and industry fixed effects. To 
remain consistent with the extant literature we use the one year lag of leverage, Tobin’s Q 
value, and sales level in the regression.  
Table 6 shows the regression results of the effect of bank ownership on firm investment 
efficiency, measured as the sensitivity of investment expenditures to investment opportunities 
                                                          
4 These measures include (1) the ratio of change in net fixed assets plus deprecation to total net fixed assets 
(Pindado et al., 2011; Firth et al., 2012), (2) ratio of cash payments for fixed assets, intangible assets and other 
long-term assets less cash receipts from selling these assets to total assets (Chen et al., 2011). 
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for full sample as well as both the SOEs and non-SOE sub-samples. As can be seen from 
Table 6 for the full sample, the estimated coefficients on both proxies for bank ownership are 
positive in both regressions, indicating that bank ownership encourages firm investment 
expenditures on average, and the effects are statistically significant (t-values are 2.62 and 
2.09, respectively). When we divide our total sample into SOEs and non-SOEs, we find that 
the estimated coefficients on bank ownership are consistently positive and statistically 
significant for non-SOEs but become insignificant for SOEs, indicating that bank ownership 
has a more significantly positive effect on encouraging investment expenditures in non-SOEs, 
while bank ownership only matters marginally in SOEs. We are more concerned about the 
interaction terms between bank ownership and Tobin’s Q in each regression and we observe 
some interesting evidence. For the full sample we observe negative and significant 
coefficients on Bankdummy*Q and Bankshare*Q in both specifications, indicating that on 
average bank ownership reduces investment efficiency. In column 1 for instance the 
estimated coefficient on Bankdummy*Q is -0.03 and the t-value is -2.14 indicating that for 
every 1% change in Tobin’s Q, the change in investment is 3% lower for firms with bank 
ownership than for firms without bank ownership. We further divide our total sample into 
two groups of SOEs and non-SOEs and some interesting evidence emerge. For the SOE sub-
sample, the effect of bank ownership on investment efficiency remains negative and 
statistically significant. For non-SOEs the bank ownership effect turns out to be positive, 
indicating that bank ownership can enhance the investment efficiency for non-SOEs. 
According to our hypothesis, bank ownership exerts less ex post monitoring on investment 
policy for SOEs than non-SOEs. .  
In addition, in all the regressions we find that the coefficients on Leverage are negative 
and statistically significant at the 1% levels (except for SOE sub-sample). For example, in 
column 1 the coefficient on Leverage is -0.19 and the t-value is -4.35. These results are 
consistent with previous studies that firm’s leverage is negatively related to firm investment 
expenditures because it may either induce underinvestment (Myers, 1977) or reduce 
overinvestment (Stulz, 1990). Among other control variables, we also find that the estimated 
coefficients on Income are positive and statistically significant in all specifications, which is 
consistent with Pindado et al. (2011) who suggest that funds available to firms are positively 
related to firm investment decisions. We further find that firm size and tangible assets are 
both positively and significantly related to the investment, which echoes the findings by 
Aviazian et al. (2005) and Firth et al. (2008). The level of sales reflects the firm’s growth 
prospects and the negative relationship between the sales level and investment is consistent 
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with the findings of Aviazian et al. (2005) using the pooling regression. When we apply the 
fixed effect regression in the additional tests, the estimated coefficient on sales level turns out 
to be positive, indicating that firms generating higher revenue are likely to invest more. 
Overall, the results of our equation are consistent with previous evidence. 
Table 6. Impact of bank ownership on investment efficiency 















































































































Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Sum tests a 3.34*** 2.79*** 2.19** 2.84*** 3.55*** 3.29*** 
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.55 0.63 0.62 0.63 0.59 
Observations 8476 8476 5939 5939 2537 2537 
a Reports the significance tests of the sum of the estimated coefficients between Q and Bankdummy*Q, and 
between Q and Bankshare*Q in each regression. 
Dependent variable is investment, defined as the ratio of net capital expenditure to total fixed assets. 
Bankdummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has a bank shareholder and 0 otherwise. Bankshare is the 
percentage of shares held by bank shareholders. Q is the ratio of firm market value to replacement value. 
Leverage is the ratio of bank loans to total assets. Income is the ratio of internal cash flow to total assets. Size is 
the log of firm total assets. Sales is the ratio of sales to total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of firm’s tangible 
assets to total assets. 
The T-statistics are in parentheses and were computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard 
error, clustered by firm, while *, **, *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
4.3 Economic stimulus package and endogeneity issue 
As we describe before, commercial banks were encouraged to participate in the 
sponsorship and underwriting business of IPO of large SOEs, while since 1995, according to 
the Commercial Bank Law (revised in 2003), banks were prohibited from holding new 
ownership in non-financial companies. This indicates that bank ownership could not be 
increased but bank shareholders can also sell out their ownership due to observable and non-
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observable factors, so in this sense bank ownership suffers from an endogeneity issue. To 
address this problem we apply an economic stimulus package (ESP) as a natural experiment 
to test whether our results for correcting the endogeneity issue. We argue that an economic 
stimulus package is a relatively exogenous shock, at least with respect to any individual firm, 
that significantly increases the funds available on investment expenditures for firms. Holding 
bank ownership constant, this shock to the funds available increases the expected level of 
both lending level and investment expenditures. To provide some empirical evidence we 
repeat our above analysis by adding one dummy variable Package, which is equal to 1 for 
firm-year observations during the post-ESP period and 0 during the pre-ESP period, and the 
results are reported in Table 7 below.  
In Panel A we repeat our equation (1) where the dependent variable is the ratio of bank 
loan to total debt value. From the results in Panel A we observe consistent coefficients on 
bank ownership and the interaction term between bank ownership and ROS that are as 
consistent as those in Table 5, and moreover, bank ownership has a positive coefficient in all 
specifications. The interaction term has a negative coefficient for the SOEs and a positive 
coefficient for the non-SOEs. We are more concerned about the interaction term between 
bank ownership, ROS and Package. For SOEs we find a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient, which indicate that after the economic stimulus package the SOEs with bank 
ownership are more likely to receive bank loans, regardless of their firm performance. For 
non-SOEs the positive coefficient suggests that bank ownership extends more efficient 
monitoring over their lending decisions to non-SOEs after the economic stimulus package.  
In Panel B we report the results of our estimation of equation (2). As can be seen from 
Panel B, we find consistent estimated coefficients on our key variables of bank ownership 
and interaction terms between bank ownership and Tobin’s Q, and the results are reported in 
Table 6. In Table 7 we are more concerned about any variables of Package and its interaction 
terms with bank ownership and Tobin’s Q. Specifically, we observe insignificant  coefficients 
on the Bankdummy*Package and Bankshare*Package in all the samples, suggesting that the 
bank ownership effect on investment expenditures does not change significantly before and 
after the economic stimulus package. As for the variables of both Bankdummy*Q*Package 
and Bankshare*Q*Package, we find statistically negative coefficients for the full sample and 
SOEs, and positive coefficients for non-SOEs. For example, in column 1 the coefficients on 
Bankdummy*Q and Bank*Q*Package are -0.02 and -0.01 significant at the 5% level (t-values 
are -2.34 and -2.46, respectively). These results indicate that bank ownership weakens the 
investment efficiency for SOEs while enhances investment efficiency for non-SOEs, and 
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these effects have been reinforced after the introduction of the economic stimulus package. 
Our results suggest that low bank lending and investment efficiencies in SOE firms with bank 
ownership is exacerbated by the economic stimulus package implemented by the government. 
Overall, the results from Table 7 are consistent with the results from Table 6, which confirms 
that our results are robust for the correction of taking the endogeneity issue into account. In 
consistent with the previous tables, we also report the sum tests to test whether the sum of the 
estimated coefficients are also significant. From both Panel A and Panel B, we find that all 
the sum tests are significant, which suggests that our sum coefficients are also significant.   
Table 7. Impact of bank ownership on investment efficiency: natural experiment method 
 Full sample SOE sub-sample Non-SOE sub-sample 













































































Other control variables include Tobin’s Q, firm size, tangibility, political connection, board size, independent 
director ratio, year and industry fixed effects 
Sum tests a 4.52*** 5.33*** 4.21*** 5.13*** 6.98*** 5.88*** 
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.28 0.29 
Observations 8476 8476 5939 5939 2537 2537 





















































Package 0.09*** 0.03*** 0.09** 0.03** 0.07* 0.03* 
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Other control variables include leverage, income, firm size, sales, tangibility, year and industry fixed effects 
Sum tests b 2.37** 3.46*** 3.78*** 4.13*** 8.55*** 6.11*** 
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.59 0.58 
Observations 8476 8476 5939 5939 2537 2537 
a Reports the significance tests of the sum of the estimated coefficients between ROS and 
Bankdummy*ROS*Package, and between ROS and Bankshare*ROS*Package in each regression. 
b Reports the significance tests of the sum of the estimated coefficients of Q and Bank*Q*Package in each 
regression.   
This table reports the regression results using natural experiment method to address the endogeneity issue of 
bank ownership. Package is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firm-year observations falling during the post-ESP 
period. All the variables are defined the same as those in Table 6. 
The T-statistics are in parentheses and were computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard 
error, clustered by firm, while *, **, *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
In addition, we also choose the two-stage least square (2SLS) approach to address this 
endogeneity issue. In the first stage we regress bank ownership against a set of control 
variables, and in the second stage we use the predicted value of bank ownership obtained 
from the first stage as a proxy for bank ownership in the investment equation. Moreover, we 
also apply the fixed effect regression to further check the robustness of our results. Following 
the discussion by Lang et al. (1996), Aivazian et al. (2005) and Firth et al. (2008), we use the 
firm fixed effect panel data regression to mitigate the unobservable time-invariant firm effect. 
Lang et al. (1996) assume that the unobservable individual effect is zero and use a pooling 
regression to estimate the investment equation, while Aviazian et al. (2005) argue there is 
large heterogeneity across industries and across firms within the same industry, so to control 
for individual firm heterogeneity they suggest that the fixed effect model would be more 
appropriate (Firth et al., 2008). To be robust and consider both scenarios, we also estimate the 
regression results with fixed effect regression and obtain similar results.   
4.4 Additional tests and discussion 
Our findings suggest that bank ownership affects both bank lending decisions and firm 
investment behaviour differently between SOEs and non-SOEs. Because this study proposes 
that banks’ ex ante monitoring on their lending decisions affects firm investment policies, and 
it is the mechanism through which bank ownership affects firm performance, thus it is 
interesting to explore whether bank ownership influences firm performance in the same way 
as it influences lending and investment in our hypotheses. To test our additional hypothesis 
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where Performance is the measure of firm performance. We apply return on assets (ROA) as 
a proxy for firm performance. All the other variables are defined the same as those in 
equation (1). The regression results are reported in Table 8. As in our equation (2), we 
assume that firm investment is determined by a set of variables which are also included in 
equation (3), thus our regression suffers from an endogenous issue. To address this issue we 
apply the 2SLS method. In the first stage we estimate our equation (2) by adding the regional 
index as the instrumental variable following Fan et al. (2011), and dropping the interaction 
term between bank ownership and Tobin’s Q. In the second stage the value of investment is 
the predicted value obtained from the first stage (our equation 2). We report the results for the 
first and second stage in Table 8.    
As can be seen from Table 8 and Panel A, we find that the regional index is positively 
related to firm investment expenditures, indicating that the firm average investment level is 
significantly higher in the area with better development. In Panel B we find evidence 
supporting our hypothesis that bank ownership affects firm performance through investment 
policy differently between SOEs and non-SOEs. For the full sample we find that both bank 
ownership and the interaction term between bank ownership and investment are negatively 
related to firm performance which is consistent with the previous evidence in emerging 
markets (Fok et al., 2004; Lin et al., 2009). However, we are curious about the bank 
ownership effect on firm performance and rerun the regression for both SOEs and non-SOE 
sub-samples respectively, and report the results in columns 3 to 6. In particular, we observe 
that bank ownership has a negative effect on firm performance for SOEs. When we combine 
the net effect of Bankdummy*PInvestment and PInvestment, we find that investment is 
negatively related to firm performance for SOEs. For example, in column 3 the estimated 
coefficients on Bankdummy*PInvestment and PInvestment are -0.33 and 0.15 significant at 
5% and 1% levels (t-values are -2.18 and 6.03), and the net effect is negative (-0.33+0.15=-
0.18), whereas the opposite effect occurs in the non-SOE sub-sample. For instance, in column 
5 the estimated coefficients on Bankdummy*PInvestment and PInvestment are 0.09 and 0.23 
significant at 5% and 1% levels (t-values are 2.55 and 3.56), and the net effect is positive 
(0.09+0.23=0.32), indicating that investment is positively related to firm performance. 
Furthermore, a similar effect occurs when we apply the percentage of shares held by bank 
shareholders as the measure of bank ownership. In general, our results suggest that bank 
ownership has a negative effect on firm performance in SOEs and a positive effect on firm 
performance in non-SOEs. As a robustness check, we rerun our equation (2) by applying 
different proxies for firm performance, including return on sales (ROS) and Tobin’s Q (Q), 
24 
 
and we find results that are similar to those reported in Table 8. Overall, our study suggests 
that bank ownership helps SOEs obtain easier access to bank loans but does not exert enough 
monitoring over their loans or how they are used. However, in non-SOEs bank ownership is 
more likely to exercise monitoring functions which improves firm performance. We argue 
that whether bank ownership is positively related to firm performance relies on firm 
investment policy. 
Table 8. Regression results of bank ownership on firm performance: 2SLS method 
 Full sample  SOEs  Non-SOEs  














































































































Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Adjusted R2 0.56 0.55 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.59 
Observations 8476 8476 5939 5939 2537 2537 



































































































Constant -0.35*** -0.35*** -0.32*** -0.33*** -0.47*** -0.47*** 
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(-11.83) (-11.83) (-9.82) (-9.77) (-7.12) (-7.18) 
Year fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Sum tests a 3.44*** 4.62*** 2.80*** 4.78*** 3.33*** 3.66*** 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.25 0.43 0.43 
Observations 8476 8476 5939 5939 2537 2537 
a Reports the significance tests of the sum of the estimated coefficients between PInvestment and 
Bankdummy*PInvestment, and between PInvestment and Bankshare*PInvestment in each regression. 
This table reports the results where we estimate firm performance against bank ownership and other control 
variables. Panel A reports the first stage results where dependent variable is firm investment. Regional index is 
the index composited by Fan et al. (2011) as the proxy for regional development. Panel B reports the second 
stage results where dependent variable is firm performance, measured as return on assets (ROA). PInvestment is 
the predicted value of firm investment obtained from the first stage. Largest is the percentage of shares held by 
the largest shareholder. Board is the log of number of director on the boards. Indep is the percentage of 
independent directors to total number of directors on the boards. All the other variables are defined the same in 
previous tables. 
The T-statistics are in parentheses and were computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard 
error, clustered by firm, while *, **, *** indicate the significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is to examine the financial implications of bank ownership to 
bank lending and firm investment efficiencies. Motivated by the existing mixed evidence of 
how bank ownership affects firm performance, we dig deeper to investigate the mechanism 
through which bank ownership influences firm performance, to explain the existing mixed 
evidence. We specifically reveal that bank lending decisions relate to firm investment policy, 
which is a mechanism resulting in different effects that bank ownership has on firm 
performance. We use data from China’s listed firms and find that the presence of direct bank 
ownership relates to easier access to bank loans and higher investment expenditures. 
However, bank ownership affects lending and investment efficiencies between SOEs and 
non-SOEs quite differently in that bank ownership weakens bank lending and firm 
investment efficiencies for SOEs, while enhancing lending and investment efficiencies for 
non-SOEs. 
Our results also provide evidence to support our hypothesis that whether bank ownership 
can increase firm performance depends heavily on whether investment is efficient or not. Our 
findings complement extant evidence that bank ownership facilitates investment through 
easier access to bank loans, but banks choose to extend less effective monitoring over their 
loans to affiliated SOEs. In contract bank ownership in non-SOEs, the bank actively monitors 
and strengthens the firm’s investment efficiency. We also provide evidence that the economic 
stimulus package had a negative impact on economic efficiency in SOEs, with our results 
showing that low bank lending and investment efficiencies in firms with bank ownership is 
exacerbated by government intervention.  
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Overall, we argue that in an emerging market, the effect of bank ownership on firms’ 
investment efficiency and performance will depend on firms’ ownership structure. Banks are 
more likely to exert monitoring functions for non-SOEs through a mechanism where they 
take ownership and lend to a firm based on their commercial judgement, which lead to an 
efficient investment and adds value to the firm. Conversely, bank ownership reduces 
investment efficiency and destroys firm value for SOEs. We shed light on the importance of 
bank ownership on firm decisions and performance through lending decisions and investment 
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